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SESSION 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau
President & CEO
The Professional Services Council

I.

UPSETTING THE APPLE CART: A NEW ADMINISTRATION, PERSPECTIVE,
APPROACH, AND BASELINE.

2017 is shaping up to be one of the least predictable years in modern memory. Few predicted that
Donald Trump would succeed Barack Obama as President of the United States. More importantly, little or
no program or contract planning revolved around that outcome. By the time of this conference, President
Trump will have been inaugurated, but most senior appointees will not have been confirmed or even nominated. Looking ahead, our sense is that, quite simply, it would be folly to rely on pre-existing assumptions
about government contracts or, for that matter, governance. The biggest questions revolve around what
aspects – if any – of the status quo remain unchanged. Of course, related questions arise with regard to
the pace and extent of change. But, no matter how you want to say it, we’ll begin with the words of the
2016 Pulitzer Prize winning bard, Bob Dylan: the times, they are a-changin’…. Much more on this, below.
II.

SPECULATING ON PROCUREMENT SPENDING: PLATEAU, RECOVERY, RESURGENCE?

A. Good News? After the Bottom, Upward Motion. Attendees should be cheered to learn that
2016 reversed the seven-year decline in federal procurement spending. By the time, we reached bottom,
annual federal procurement spending had dropped by more than $100B. (Go ahead, read that again. It
was a significant drop.) We have stopped falling, but are we now headed in the other direction?
The chart below summarizes this post-millennial procurement spending cycle. On first glance, it appears
that the post-recession spending plunge has ended. Now the question is whether spending will stabilize,
increase, or, of course, drop again. Here, this chapter continues past practice, taking a broader view of the
spending picture to redefine the pie by including grant spending. In that context, the 2016 overall spending layouts – combining contracts and grants – appear quite robust, indeed, presenting the third highest
total in this century (although, of course, these numbers have not been adjusted for inflation).
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Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001-2016*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending (in Billions of $)

Grant Spending
(in Billions of $)

Procurement & Grant Spending (Combined, in Billions of $)

2016

$462.8*

$654.5*

$1,117.3*

2015

$433.0

$616.8

$1,049.8

2014

$441.8

$603.4

$1,045.2

2013

$460.0

$521.6

$981.6

2012

$519.3

$543.1

$1,062.4

2011

$539.3

$572.6

$1,111.9

2010

$540.2

$623.2

$1,163.4

2009

$540.8

$675.6

$1,216.4

2008

$541.2

$420.7

$961.9

2007

$469.3

$430.2

$899.5

2006

$430.5

$490.0

$920.5

2005

$391.2

$441.7

$832.9

2004

$346.1

$450.1

$796.2

2003

$318.0

$493.7

$811.7

2002

$264.1

$406.3

$670.4

2001

$223.0

$330.8

$553.8

*FY 2016 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. See www.USASpending.gov.
Also, the total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2008-2015, changed –
in some years, significantly – when compared to last year’s USASpending reports. Changes to prior
years tend to be less statistically significant.

B. The Post-Millennial Trend Line? Too Early for Extrapolation?
Regular attendees of this conference are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal procurement spending trend. The postmillennial binge (before the 2008 economic crisis) was significant not only
for its longevity but for its size. To review:

© 2017 Thomson Reuters

•

In Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just
over $223 billion.

•

The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20
percent spending increases.

•

After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached
an unprecedented plateau where federal procurement spending
stabilized at approximately $540 billion from Fiscal Years 2008
through 2011.

•

In 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement
spending for well over a decade, but the decreases were statistically
insignificant (and it took a number of years for the data to catch
up). Indeed, much of the post-2008 panic seemed either premature
or an over-reaction, as, for a number of years, the only macro-level
spending effect was an absence of growth or expansion.

•

In 2012, we finally experienced the first dramatic decline in spending and, then, a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion
threshold in 2013.

•

Two years later, procurement spending appeared to bottom out at
$433B, more than $100 billion below the 2008-2011 plateau.
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•

Last year saw a nearly seven percent increase in procurement
spending (erasing two years’ worth of decreases), bringing the
number back to the 2013 spending level.

•

It’s worth paying attend to grants! Consistent with the trend
this chapter has previously reported, in 2016, grant spending
exceeded procurement spending, as it has for fourteen of the last
sixteen years. And the gap is widening. For the last three years, the
government expended 35-45 percent more dollars through grants
than through contracts.

C. No Sequestration, Continuing Resolutions, A Half-Year Budget
Cycle? Fortunately, despite some last minute drama, we did not experience
the dramatic disruption of sequestration in 2016. For better or worse, Congress
decided to kick the can down the street, failing to pass appropriations either
before or even after the election. With a continuing resolution that runs through
April 2017 for all but VA and MilCon, we worry about how Congress or the
agencies execute a 5 month appropriations. Many, including PSC, argued that
their time and energy would be better spent planning for the following (full)
fiscal year. None of this supports the kind of stable funding that facilitates efficient, long-term investment decisions and contractual relationships.
D. The Future of Procurement Data: Something Better? A Global
Standard? There is an evolving global conversation on open contracting data.
“The Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) enables disclosure of data and
documents at all stages of the contracting process by defining a common data
model. It was created to support organisations [sic] to increase contracting
transparency, and allow deeper analysis of contracting data by a wide range of
users.” Open Contracting Data Standard at http://standard.open-contracting.
org/latest/en/. This is a much more far-reaching effort than simply improving the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) or USASpending data
resources. The Open Data advocates envision global standards on what we
generally refer to a single point of entry site – e.g., our www.AQUISITION.
Gov site, managed by GSA. But the open contracting data initiative aspires
to encourage nations to publish data for each step of the contracting process, create summary records for an overall contracting process, and make
available re-useable objects, such as tender (or bid or proposal) information,
line-items, amounts, milestones, documents etc. The United States, historically a leader on procurement transparency, is not driving the train on this
and, arguably, is lagging behind. See, generally, Bill Would Require Posting
Large Contracts Online, 58 GC ¶ 107; Congress Has Limited Visibility Into
DOD Service Acquisitions, GAO Determines, 58 GC ¶ 67, GAO-16-119, DOD
Service Acquisition: Improved Use of Available Data Needed to Better Manage and Forecast Service Contract Requirements, available at www.gao.gov/
assets/680/675276.pdf; The U.S. Government’s Open Data initiative at: www.
data.gov and https://project-open-data.cio.gov/. See also the Sunlight Foundation’s Open Data Policy Guidelines, at https://sunlightfoundation.com/opendataguidelines/. Keep in mind that the leap from the (largely impenetrable)
FPDS to USASpending derived from a private sector (OMB Watch) initiative.
Time will tell how quickly the U.S. embraces this global movement.
III. FAREWELL TO BETTER BUYING POWER: A NEW
APPROACH AT DOD
A (dramatic) change of administrations ensures that there will be significant leadership, managerial, and philosophical changes at the Defense
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Department. It is premature to anticipate what the defense acquisition
leadership will look like, but some things are clear.
A. Whither the 809 Panel? Of course, we are curious what will happen, if anything, with the DoD 809 panel’s work product. See NDAA Section
809 for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, which required the Secretary
of Defense to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying
acquisition regulations. The massive study panel has been working on five
target areas: (1) establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller
relationships; (2) improving the functioning of the system; (3) ensuring the
continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs;
(4) protecting the best interests of DoD; and (5) eliminating any regulations
that are unnecessary for the purposes described. Will there be an audience for
the panel’s work? At a minimum, given the amount of energy expended, we
hope the Panel publishes a summary report. See, generally, Vernon J. Edwards,
The Department of Defense’s Section 809 Advisory Panel: Recommendations,
30 N&CR ¶ 52 (October 2016) (offering 15 recommendations, including: “Free
the DOD from the [FAR] system and let it write its own Defense Acquisition
Regulation[;].... Raise the simplified acquisition threshold to $1 million and
the micro-purchase threshold to $25,000[;]... Take the rules and procedures
for simplified acquisitions out of the FAR (or a new DAR) and put them in a
separate publication[;] ... Prohibit price competition (evaluation of proposed
estimated costs) in the award of cost-reimbursement contracts[;] ... and
[include] at least one knowledgeable Gen Xer, Gen Yer, and maybe even a
Millennial.... They’re going to be in charge in a very few years, if they aren’t
running a contracting office or contracting activity already. They probably
have a lot more recent working-level experience with the current regulations
than the named appointees.”)
B. NDAA Eliminates USD(AT&L). In the Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17)
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress, led by the Senate
Armed Services Committee, reversed the central recommendation of the
1986 Packard Commission and eliminated the position of Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics, replacing it with two new under
secretaries, one for research and engineering, and one for acquisition and
logistics. See http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2017_pdfs/
AUTH/CRPT-114HRPT-S2943-JES.pdf. Congress gave DoD a year to plan
these new organizations with little specific guidance. In reality, any changes
to the statute will need to be developed quickly if they are to be included in
the FY18 NDAA, which will be marked up in the next few months.
C. DoD Continues Its Effort to Analyze Metrics. For the last few
years, these materials suggested that some of the most thought-provoking
reading was found in DoD’s nascent performance, outcome, or metrics, initiative. AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance Report,
55 GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Performance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf; AT&L Releases Second Annual DOD
Acquisition Assessment, 56 GC ¶ 208; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/
Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf; AT&L’s Third DOD Acquisition Assessment Scrutinizes Subcontractor Margins, Program Baselines,
57 GC ¶ 309; and now: AT&L’s Fourth DOD Acquisition Assessment Sees Low
Rates Of Cost Growth, Protest Sustainment, 58 GC ¶ 382, available at http://
bbp.dau.mil/docs/performance-of-defense-acquisition-system-2016.pdf.
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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We applaud this initiative, because focusing on outcomes, rather than
processes, is critical to successful procurement. As was its predecessors, the
new (lengthy – 174 single-spaced pages) report is chock-full of intriguing
observations and conclusions. The report begins with an attempt to dispel a
number of common myths by explaining that:
•

Cost control in defense acquisition programs has improved significantly.

•

Most major programs deliver the original baseline quantity or
more.

•

The dynamics of cost estimates indicate that Operation and Support (O&S) costs are heavily driven by external inflation factors.

•

High-level requirements seldom change on major programs, and
very few programs have many changes. In other words, program
requirements are more stable than you think.

•

DoD acquisition can be timely and responsive.

•

Contracting processes are generally fair, rigorous, and objective—
and protests are rarely sustained. (If you didn’t know this, you
are probably attending this conference for the first time, and you
skipped yesterday’s sessions.)

•

Major defense companies remain profitable despite the DoD’s
increased success at tying profits to performance.

•

The system is not broken. Instead, the acquisition system for decades
has given the United States the most capable military in the world
and has been improving both in the past and more recently.

Frankly, we think it’s worth the energy it takes for DoD to write – and attempt to demonstrate – the truth of these propositions. Someday, we hope
that GAO will join in the enterprise. We also enjoyed the additional insights
highlighted by the report. Some of our favorites included:
•

The lack of programs in DoD’s “new product pipeline” may be putting technological superiority at risk.

•

Be particularly careful to ensure realistic program baselines—especially when budgets are tight.

•

Be prepared to incur statutory overrun penalties.

•

Listen to feedback from the DoD’s professional acquisition leadership.

•

Focusing on acquisition fundamentals and cost control makes a
difference.

•

Don’t neglect suitability (reliability, maintainability, etc.) in pursuing system performance.

•

Use fixed-price contracting judiciously in development.

We hope that Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Frank Kendall’s successor (whether under the old
or new organization) continues this annual performance assessment reporting enterprise. Ultimately, information is power. As noted in his principles
article, discussed below, outside of Frank Kendall’s door appears the sign: “In
God We Trust; All Others Must Bring Data.” We hope the sign remains long
after Frank’s departure.
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D. A Better Buying Power (BBP) Legacy? Better Buying Power, which
now has progressed from its unnumbered introduction through version 3.0,
has likely run its course. Among other initiatives in BBP, we hope that the
new administration moves quickly to jettison the independent research and
development (IR&D) initiatives. See, e.g., PSC Asks DoD to Suspend Work on
Proposed IR&D Regulations, http://www.pscouncil.org/News2/NewsReleases/2016/PSC_Asks_DoD_to_Suspend_Work_on_Proposed_IRD_regulations.
aspx; Proposed DFARS Rule Could Lead To Uniform Evaluation Of IR&D
Costs, 58 GC ¶ 407 (suggests the rulemaking was premature; and “this may
be an answer looking for a problem, rather than an actual problem”; fears of
misuse of IR&D costs are “overblown,” current cost accounting rules already
address the concerns, and “there is no evidence that such behavior is common
in the defense industry”); DFARS Final Rule Requires IR&D ‘Technical Interchanges’, 58 GC ¶ 406; ABA Section Urges Withdrawal Of DFARS Proposed
Rule On Future IR&D Expenses, 58 GC ¶ 157; Industry Urges Withdrawal
Of DFARS Rule On Future IR&D Expenses, 58 GC ¶ 134. More broadly, we
will be curious to see what future, if any, there is for “should cost” analysis
as currently implemented.
On a more positive note, BBP may have left behind an unexpectedly
useful legacy. Early in 2016, we were intrigued to read Frank Kendall’s
short article, Better Buying Power Principles-What Are They?, USDAT&L
Magazine (Jan-Feb 2016), http://dau.dodlive.mil/2015/12/28/better-buyingpower-principles-what-are-they/. Kendall explained that, not surprisingly,
stakeholders frequently asserted that their decisions were guided by “BPP
principles.” This left Kendall perplexed, since no BBP guiding principles had
even been articulated, much less published. We appreciate Kendall’s irony. But
any humor here is tempered by a deep-seeded frustration that an initiative
of this scale and complexity advanced so far without deriving from, or relying on, clearly articulated principles to begin with. Still, unlike many of the
disconnected and all-too-often unproductive BBP initiatives, there is much
to recommend in the BBP principles document. Kendall’s ten principles are:
1.

Continuous improvement will be more effective than radical
change.

2.

Data should drive policy.

3.

Critical thinking is necessary for success; fixed rules are too constraining.

4.

Controlling life-cycle cost is one of our jobs; staying on budget isn’t
enough.

5.

People matter most; we can never be too professional or too competent.

6.

Incentives work—we get what we reward.

7.

Competition and the threat of competition are the most effective
incentives.

8.

Defense acquisition is a team sport.

9.

Our technological superiority is at risk and we must respond.

10. We should have the courage to challenge bad policy.
We encourage future DoD leaders and policymakers to begin with these
principles, rather than the overwhelming BBP 3.0 briefing slide or background
documentation, as a useful rubric for considering meaningful improvements to
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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defense acquisition. (As an academic exercise, we challenge you to correlate the
principles with the BBP initiatives. See the DoD Acquisition Performance Assessment document, below, pages 139-142. We think it’s a fascinating exercise.)
IV. FROM PRINCIPLES TO OBSTACLES: PERCEPTIONS OF
ACQUISITION LEADERS
Regular attendees know that this review has consistently and prominently
featured the Professional Services Council Acquisition Policy Surveys. The
PSC survey of acquisition experts and leaders historically has, for more than
a decade, “probed on a[n interconnected] set of five core topics currently affecting federal acquisition: workforce, budget, communications and collaboration,
access to innovation, and oversight and compliance.” The 2016 survey, true to
form, is instructive, primarily because it includes the opinion of a broad and
experienced cross-section of knowledgeable practitioners. Biennial Federal
Acquisition Survey Finds Oversight, Workforce Challenges, 58 GC ¶ 221. The
new administration would be well served to read the full report and consider,
among other things:
• Acquisition Workforce. If you are reading these materials, we do
not need to convince you that successful contracting outcomes depend upon
people. And for too long, the government has not paid sufficient attention to
this fundamental cog in the acquisition wheel. (See also, CRS Surveys DOD
Acquisition Workforce Hiring Flexibilities, 58 GC ¶ 431; DOD Acquisition
Workforce Grows, But Challenges Persist, 58 GC ¶ 275 (“many observers believe
that DOD still faces significant challenges in improving the performance of
the workforce”); Defense Acquisition Workforce Growth Goals Need Updating, GAO Says, 58 GC ¶ 4.) Still, possibly the most positive tidbit in the PSC
report is that most interviewees concluded that the government’s acquisition
workforce had not gotten worse over the last two years. That’s not a ringing
endorsement, but, after more than a quarter-century of under-investment in
the federal acquisition workforce, we’re identifying it as a step in the right
direction.
•

With regard to specific skills, the lion’s share of respondents
concluded that the workforce struggled with developing detailed
requirements and scopes of work. That’s important, given that no
amount of compliance training (focused on following rules) can
close that skill gap.

•

We were intrigued by the respondents’ perception that government
acquisition personnel’s critical thinking and negotiating skills
were stagnating or under-developed. At the same time, we were
sympathetic with the perception that “There is simply not enough
time or experienced personnel to do everything that we need …
or want to do. We need more people who are capable of critical
thinking and they must be allowed time needed to [think].”

•

The survey, unsurprisingly, focused on the generational divide
found in most workplaces today. Respondents also noted that: “ongoing retirements mean new hires do not benefit from mentoring
and on-the-job training at the hands of their more experienced
colleagues, [even though that is] a critical component in gaining
a grasp of the full spectrum of acquisition[.]” We were encouraged
by the discussion of rotational assignments, succession planning,
and leadership development, all of which have received insufficient
attention for decades.
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•

Sadly, there’s not much help on the way, as hiring remains “extremely difficult.” “Even if an agency can attract qualified candidates to an acquisition position and compensate them sufficiently
to compete with the private sector, the federal hiring process
simply takes too long and makes it too difficult to get the right
people in the right place.”

• Budget. Not surprisingly, respondents generally agreed that budget
uncertainty was now the status quo, they did not expect short-term improvements, and that “[b]udget instability exacerbates the capacity issue.” Respondents noted that their strategies for dealing with budgetary uncertainty
included the use of bridge contracts, greater reliance on IDIQ vehicles, and
supposed cost saving mechanisms, such as Low Price Technically Acceptable
(LPTA) competitions. See, generally, Defense Secretary Calls For Budget
Stability, Flexibility In Acquisition Process, 58 GC ¶ 101 (“Congress should
address sequestration to create stability in the defense budget and provide …
greater flexibility in starting acquisition programs.... [DOD] “would welcome
greater flexibility in appropriations or reprogramming to initiate development
of urgently needed capabilities[.]”).
•

Impediments to Communication and Collaboration.

•

We believe that contracts – like any relationship – depend upon
open and meaningful communication between the buyer and seller.
Although respondents reported observing only limited progress
with regard to the free flow of important information between
business partners, many respondents were optimistic that things
may improve in the future. (Sadly, it seems that former OFPP
Administrator Daniel Gordon’s Myth Busting campaign – which
numerous respondents had never heard of – has had negligible
impact on fundamental behavioral changes, but maybe it’s just
taking longer than expected. We note with approval the re-issuance
of some Myth Busters – see, for example, Lesley A. Field, “Mythbusting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication with
Effective Debriefings (January 5, 2017), available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/mythbusting_3_further_improving_industry_communications_with_effectiv....pdf.)

•

The survey report devotes extensive coverage to a wide array of
acquisition innovations – including GSA’s 18F, DIUx, Innovation
Laboratories, Challenges, etc. – but many respondents remained
skeptical “both in the government’s ability to innovate and whether
the emphasis on innovation is warranted or even fully understood.”
Respondents indicated that the most significant inhibitors to obtaining innovative solutions to meet their needs included agency
workforce skills, fear of oversight or protests, and the FAR (or
agency regulations). See also Defense Innovation Board Makes
Interim Recommendations, 58 GC ¶ 363; Defense Secretary Unveils
Defense Innovation Advisory Board, 58 GC ¶ 77; Experimentation,
Agility Can Help Military Services Improve Acquisitions, Officials
Testify, 58 GC ¶ 10.

• Oversight and Compliance. Consistent with past reports, respondents
noted the substantial burden of oversight and compliance for both contractors
and federal acquisition personnel. On a positive note, we were pleased that less
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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fear was concentrated around the risk of prosecution, which would be a positive
trend. (Granted, respondents did suggest that Inspectors General (IG) focused
more on punishing supposed culprits than improving acquisitions.) Conversely, it
was unnerving to be reminded that “more concern was expressed for the pace [of
new compliance mandates] rather than their substance.” (See also our discussion,
below, about cost-drivers.) Moreover, both government and industry appeared to
agree on the requirements they viewed as most burdensome:
•

the Congressionally-mandated inventory of services contractors,
which some saw as primarily a political instrument; see also, GAO
Questions Accuracy Of DOD Service Contracts Inventory, 58 GC
¶ 392; DOD Services Contract Inventory Suffers From Incomplete,
Inconsistent Data, 58 GC ¶ 197.

•

overuse of Executive Orders, particularly with regard to labor and
employment issues; see also, Final FAR Rule Limits Allowable
Government Contractor Employee Compensation Costs, 58 GC
¶ 368; DOL Final Rule Requires Contractors To Provide Paid Sick
Leave, 58 GC ¶ 354; Industry Groups Urge Delay Of EO Targeting Labor Law Violators, 58 GC ¶ 347; Stephen McBrady, et al.,
Feature Comment: Preparing For Day-One Compliance With Fair
Pay And Safe Workplaces, 58 GC ¶ 323; OFCCP Overhauls Sex
Discrimination Guidelines, 58 GC ¶ 224; DOE Proposes Rule On
Nondisplacement Of Qualified Workers Under Service Contracts,
58 GC ¶ 159; ABA Section Suggests Clarifying DOL Sick Leave
Rule, 58 GC ¶ 158; Industry Group Calls Proposed Sick Leave Rule
‘Unreasonable,’ 58 GC ¶ 147; Industry Group Decries Labor Law
Disclosure EO, 58 GC ¶ 90; House Committee Okays Bill To Roll
Back Executive Action On Labor Agreements, 58 GC ¶ 25; Industry
Groups Ask White House To Halt Contractor EOs, 57 GC ¶ 256,
http://www.pscouncil.org/News2/NewsReleases/2015/Federal_Contracting_Associations_Ask_White_House_to_Halt_Contractor_Executive_Actions.aspx.

•

executive compensation reporting - again, respondents questioned
the value of executive compensation reporting to agencies and to
acquisition outcomes; and

•

more generally, the never ending stream of data calls – with respondents perceiving that much of the demanded data was never
used.

• Disaggregation and Uniformity? We were surprised to see that
a number of respondents favored consolidating procurement authority and
systems. (We wonder if this isn’t nostalgia for April Fool’s day, 1984.) Others called for further empowering or even reinventing OFPP. (More on that,
below.)
V.

IN UNCHARTED WATERS (OR, A CLEAN SLATE):
PRELIMINARY ISSUES TO WATCH IN THE FIRST YEAR OF
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

We readily admit that our government contracts-related crystal ball
remains cloudy. Indeed, our sense is that your guess is as good as ours as
to what comes next. Everyone seems to agree that the – now generational –
government outsourcing trend will continue; the questions being not only
whether it will accelerate, but more importantly: (1) whether the government
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can better define and actually measure the results it needs, and (2) whether
it can assess and understand its own costs well enough to determine when
outsourcing produces real solutions that provide value for money. Otherwise,
we appear to be in “wait and see” mode. Nonetheless, here’s a handful of additional issues we’ll be watching in 2017.
A. A De-Regulation Initiative? Most observers assume that the Republican-controlled Congress will – to some extent – reduce the volume of federal
regulation and, closer to home, roll back at least some of the ever-increasing
compliance burdens that define the federal procurement marketplace. At one
point, the Trump Transition website promised “a temporary moratorium on
all new regulation, canceling overarching executive orders and a thorough
review to identify and eliminate unnecessary regulations that kill jobs and
bloat government[.]” (Although, as of the New Year, we could no longer find the
same language on the official transition website, www.GreatAgain.gov.) In our
experience, this is much more difficult than anticipated, and we do not expect
immediate, paradigm-shifting changes in our business practices and compliance
programs. We do expect that the incoming administration will re-visit and consider rolling back the tsunami of labor-related policies implemented by the
Obama Administration through the FAR, Executive Orders, and Presidential
Memoranda. (See the discussion of oversight and compliance, above and below.)
Environmentally Friendly (Or Green) Procurement has expanded
dramatically under the Obama Administration. See, generally, FAR Part 23;
Executive Order 13514 of October 5, 2009, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance; Executive Order (EO) 13693, Planning
for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade (March 19, 2015); Presidential Memorandum of December 2, 2011, Implementation of Energy Savings
Projects and Performance-Based Contracting for Energy Savings; Section 1
of Presidential Memorandum of February 21, 2012, Driving Innovation and
Creating Jobs in Rural America through Biobased and Sustainable Product
Procurement; USDA BioPreferred Program, https://www.biopreferred.gov/
BioPreferred/, and a collection of related laws and rules at https://www.biopreferred.gov/BioPreferred/faces/pages/PoliciesAndLaws.xhtml. The Trump
Administration has staked out a decidedly different tone than the Obama
administration on environment-related issues. For example: “Rather than
continuing the current path to undermine and block America’s fossil fuel
producers, the Trump Administration will encourage the production of these
resources by opening onshore and offshore leasing on federal lands and waters.
We will streamline the permitting process for all energy projects, including
… projects held up by President Obama, and rescind the job-destroying executive actions under his Administration. We will end the war on coal, and
rescind the coal mining lease moratorium, the excessive Interior Department
stream rule, and conduct a top-down review of all anti-coal regulations….
We will eliminate the highly invasive ‘Waters of the US’ rule, and scrap the
$5 trillion dollar Obama-Clinton Climate Action Plan and the Clean Power
Plan and prevent these unilateral plans from increasing monthly electric bills
by double-digits without any measurable effect on Earth’s climate.” Trump
Transition, https://greatagain.gov (see Energy Independence).
B.(1) Compliance, Overhead, and Cost-Drivers. We do hope that,
regardless of any broader de-regulation initiative, DoD revisits the costbenefit issues associated with compliance, overhead, or cost-drivers. Attendees understand that, despite its frustration with the (perceived as excessive)
overhead rates that contractors charge, DoD remains largely powerless to
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reduce the panoply of “cost drivers” that, in large part, derive from a never
ending succession of Congressional mandates. Less than two years ago,
DoD published its disappointing and largely ineffective report on the BBPinspired initiative to address this issue. See, generally, Mark Husband &
David J. Nicholls, Eliminating Requirements Imposed on Industry Where
Costs Exceed Benefits (September 29, 2015), http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/
docs/Eliminating-Requirements-Imposed-on-Industry-Study-Report-2015.
pdf. There was reason for optimism, when DoD poignantly observed that:
“Actions that are unnecessary or of little value for acquisition directly add
costs, introduce delays in delivering capability, and bar innovative new entrants. Here, we examined several specific instances of regulatory burdens or
their implementation imposed on industry in order to eliminate unnecessary
or unproductive actions.” Alas, despite a promising aspiration, DoD took a
formalistic, rather than a pragmatic (or results-oriented) approach, and, in
doing so, defeated the purpose. The report explained that:
“Unnecessary” and “unproductive” are the key adjectives here.
Statute and regulation are not arbitrary but are designed
to serve a purpose. The Department of Defense manages a huge
taxpayer investment and must provide transparency for oversight to
assess efficiency, fairness of the acquisition system, and compliance
with broader national, social, and economic objectives. Additionally,
many regulations are a response to previous acquisition failures
and are intended to prevent recurrence. Attempts to save money by
eliminating actions without considering these impacts/benefits are
necessarily inappropriate. So, the central challenge of this work
was to identify activities which could be eliminated with no
or minimal impact on statutory or regulatory objectives.

We disagree and, rather, read that starting point as a prospective capitulation. We think the question that needs to be asked is: whether the costs
associated with individual statutes and regulations are worth it to
the DoD customer? Could it be, with a more business-friendly executive
and Republican-controlled Congress chomping at the bit to eliminate excess
regulations, that DoD might try again? We certainly think so.
B.(2) The Elephant In The Room: Re-Assessing the Pervasive Compliance Culture In Light of “Present Circumstances.” We are now, basically, a
full decade into phase in which the balance between compliance and corruption
control, on the one hand, and administrative efficiency and end-user outcomes,
on the other, has tilted decisively toward compliance. As noted above, acquisition
personnel often find that compliance concerns take precedence over serving their
customers. A bumper crop of recoveries by DOJ’s Civil Frauds Unit last year will
not help in restoring the balance. “[M]ore than $4.7 billion in settlements and
judgments from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the government in fiscal year 2016 ... [represents] the third highest annual recovery in
False Claims Act history[.]” https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrecovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016; DOJ Releases
FY 2016 FCA Statistics, 58 GC ¶ 443. Only careful readers will appreciate that
“$2.5 billion came from the health care industry ... [and t]he next largest recoveries came from the financial industry in the wake of the housing and mortgage
fraud crisis...[, which] totaled nearly $1.7 billion[.]” In other words, procurement
fraud recoveries were relatively minor in 2016. But don’t expect Congress to
internalize that message. See, generally, Robert T. Rhoad, Matthew W. Turetzky,
& Ariel E. Debin, Feature Comment: Weathering The Storm: Forecasts For FCA
Enforcement In The Trump Era, 58 GC ¶ 413; Brian Tully McLaughlin, et al.,
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Substantial Increase In False Claims Act Penalties Impacts The Landscape Of
Litigation, 58 GC ¶ 256 (among other things, “DOJ issued an interim final rule
nearly doubling the penalty range for violations under the FCA.”); DOD Adjusts
False Claims Penalties For Inflation, 58 GC ¶ 205.
And, of course, 2016 saw a steady stream of government contracts-related
scandals. The Glenn Marine (“Fat Leonard”) Scandal won’t go away any time
soon. Craig Whitlock, Navy Repeatedly Dismissed Evidence that ‘Fat Leonard’
was Cheating the 7th Fleet, Washington Post (December 27, 2016) (“Navy
allowed the worst corruption scandal in its history to fester … by dismissing
a flood of evidence that the rotund Asian defense contractor was cheating
the service out of millions of dollars and bribing officers with booze, sex and
lavish dinners”). Looking ahead: “Justice Department officials say there is
no end in sight to the investigation and that 200 people [including some 30
current or retired admirals] have fallen under scrutiny.” At the opposite end
of the spectrum is a high-profile case in which a single contractor employee
is enjoying the spotlight. Damian Paletta, Ex-NSA Contractor Stole at Least
500 Million Pages of Records and Secrets, U.S. Says, Wall Street Journal
(October 20, 2016) (former NSA contractor Hal Martin “amassed at least 500
million pages of government records, including top-secret information about
military operations, by stealing documents bit by bit over two decades”). And
these are merely the tip of the iceberg.
At the same time, the incoming administration – specifically, the President and his family business partners – has raised more questions than it
has answered with regard to what the community might expect in terms of
the new administration’s compliance culture. Transparency advocates remain
flummoxed that President Trump became the first modern-era major-party
presidential nominee to refuse to release his or her tax returns. A vast web of
personal (and family) business interests, and the inclusion of his children (and
primary business partners) as active participants in the transition team led to
a steady drum beat of calls for divestiture, creation of a blind trust, and other
solutions. See, e.g., Alina Seluyk, NPR, All Things Considered, U.S. Ethics
Chief Was Behind Those Tweets About Trump, Records Show (December 30,
2016) (referencing, among others, tweets that read: “As we discussed with your
counsel, divestiture is the way to resolve these conflicts[.]”). Cross-marketing
of hotel properties during the campaign, and the enthusiasm of foreign states
to host event at Trump hotels, have raised the public’s interest in the little
known (and hard to pronounce) Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 1, cl. 8. Closer to home, at the time this goes to
press, we are immensely curious as to whether a President will continue to
hold and benefit from a high-profile hotel contract with the General Services
Administration (GSA) in the Post Office Pavilion. See, generally, Steven L.
Schooner & Daniel I. Gordon, GSA’s Trump Hotel Lease Debacle, Government
Executive, http://www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2016/11/
gsas-trump-hotel-lease-debacle (noting, among other things, that the contract
states that “No ... elected official of the Government of the United States ...
shall be admitted to any share or part of this Lease, or to any benefit that
may arise therefrom...”; the contract requires extensive annual financial disclosures and rent adjustment negotiations; the President appoints the GSA
Administrator; etc.); Representative Elijah Cummings, et al., Letter to GSA
Administrator Denise Turner Roth (December 14, 2016); Senators Elizabeth
Warren & Tom Carper, Letter to GSA Administrator Denise Turner Roth
(December 1, 2016); Representative Elijah Cummings, et al., Letter to GSA
Administrator Denise Turner Roth (November 30, 2016).
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C. Re-Calibration of International Trade and Domestic Preferences. Trade featured prominently in the campaign, and time will tell if the
U.S. will, in fact, relinquish its global leadership as an advocate for free trade.
See, generally, FAR Part 25; GAO Compares Free Trade Agreements, 58 GC
¶ 356. While there is a healthy appetite for domestic preferences (which, of
course, means closing markets), the long-standing trade bargain depends
upon reciprocity. Our sense is that the U.S. consumers desire (and, indeed,
are addicted to) access to global goods at reasonable prices, and U.S. manufacturers desire the greatest access to export markets. Moreover, our sense
is that, increasingly, the supply chain is truly global.
D. A Pro-Business Administration? Not So Fast. The incoming
President prides himself as a successful businessman and entrepreneur, and
the Republican-controlled Congress is historically deferential to private enterprise. Does all of this signal a more business-like, or at least business-friendly,
atmosphere? Contrary to expectations, the post-election transition period was
animated with tweets and public statements from the transition team suggesting that the President might become unusually critical of, and uniquely active
– or interventionist – with regard to, major acquisition programs, contracts,
and other actions involving government contractors. Damian Paletta & Daniel
Nasaw, Donald Trump Says He Will Personally Negotiate Air Force One Price
With Boeing, Wall Street Journal (December 7, 2016); John D. McKinnon &
Andrew Tangel, Trump Steps Up Criticism of Corporate America, Wall Street
Journal (December 12, 2016) (“Mr. Trump also fired new jabs at corporations
that benefit from lucrative government contracts ... [and] called for new rules
to bar government officials from negotiating lucrative contracts with companies, and later accepting jobs with them.”); Doug Cameron & Damian Paletta,
Donald Trump’s Tweet Sets Up Jet Dogfight, Wall Street Journal (December
23, 2016) (“President-elect suggests a Boeing plane could be used as substitute
for Lockheed’s F-35 combat jet”); Ben DiPietro, Trump Poses New Reputation
Concerns for Companies, Wall Street Journal (December 27, 2016) (“discussing
risk mitigation strategies after President Elect Trump singled out individual
companies for criticism and the effect that has had on their stock prices”).
On the one hand, questioning, re-evaluating, and even terminating major
system investments are critical executive functions. We are reminded that,
among other things, the Presidential helicopter program was reined in, downscaled, cancelled, or (pick your preferred description,) restarted during the
Obama administration, prompted by President Obama’s statement on national
television that he thought the helicopter he had was “good enough.” By 2009,
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) breathed its last. And the conference’s
more experienced generation will remember that, in 1991, during George Bush’s
Presidency, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cancelled (or directed the
cancellation of) the future of Naval aviation, the A-12 stealth attack aircraft
program (which, in turn, generated a lengthy (more than two decade) and
historic level of largely unproductive litigation activity and appellate review).
On the other hand, the President rarely becomes personally involved
in individual acquisition decisions. Moreover, our system is designed with
concentrated authority residing with the contracting officer. See, generally,
FAR Subpart 1.6. Moreover, the regulations assume that “contracting officers
should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment.” FAR 1.6022. And, of course, the courts periodically have expressed concern when that
authority is not exercised as a result of, among other things, political pressure. See, generally, McDonnell Douglas Corp. & General Dynamics Corp. v.
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United States, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“level of discretion that must
be exercised by the government before terminating a contract for default is
a question of law, which we review de novo”), reversing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358 (1996); Darwin Constr. Co. v. United
States, 811 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Schlesinger v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl.
571, 390 F.2d 702 (Cl. Ct. 1968) (“neither the contracting officer nor anyone
else in the Navy exercised independent judgment in terminating the contract
for default”; and “the contractor’s ‘bare’ or ‘technical’ default ‘served only as
a useful pretext for the taking of action felt to be necessary on other grounds
unrelated to the [contractor’s] performance....’”)
E. Wild Card: Public-Private Partnerships? The Trump Transition
Team web page explains that: “the Trump Administration seeks to invest $550
billion to ensure we can export our goods and move our people faster and safer.
We will harness technology and make smarter decisions on how we build and
utilize our infrastructure. Our roads, bridges, airports, transit systems and
ports will be the envy of the world and enhance the lives of all Americans.
We will build the roads, highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, and railways of
tomorrow.” See https://greatagain.gov (see Transportation & Infrastructure
page). In a vacuum, we encourage this kind of investment in infrastructure.
We have reservations, however, given there appears no momentum to fund or
actually pay for these critical investments. The Republican-controlled House
of Representatives has expressed a lack of support for stimulus spending. The
President elect suggested that the funding might come from bonds and later
indicated that the administration would rely on “public-private partnerships,
and private investments through tax incentives[.]” See, generally, Naomi Jagoda, Questions Hang over Trump Plan on Infrastructure, The Hill (December
26, 2016). We find this approach intriguing, particularly to the extent that the
U.S. federal government lags well behind most of the world and, indeed, many
of the States in the U.S., in experimenting with and relying on public-private
partnerships. See, generally, Public-Private Partnerships Not Widely Used
By Agencies, GAO Finds, 58 CG ¶ 315, GAO-16-776R, Federal Real Property:
Public-Private Partnerships Have a Limited Role in Disposal and Management of Unneeded Property, available at www.gao.gov/assets/680/679352.pdf;
Witnesses Promote Public-Private Competition At House Oversight Subcommittee Hearing, 58 GC ¶ 250; World Bank Group, Public-Private-Partnership
in Infrastructure Resource Center, at http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships; Federal Highway
Administration, Public Private Partnerships, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/
(including an interactive map of P3 concessions in the U.S.); National Council
for Public-Private Partnerships, http://www.ncppp.org/.
F. Also, Keep Your Eye On…. We are intrigued that, after the election,
the market value of private prison contractor stocks rose. John Burnett,
Will The Private Prison Business See A Trump Bump?, NPR: All Things Considered (January 4, 2017) (noting that “the week after Election Day, stocks
of GEO and CoreCivic, the two biggest for-profit detention companies, shot
up more than 20 and 40 percent, respectively”). “Detention is an inherent
part of the machinery of deportation, and … we’re looking ahead at massive
expansion of our detention system[; … and] what we’ve seen over the last
decade is that when the detention system grows that’s mainly through the
use of private prison companies.” Keep in mind that, earlier this year, DOJ
publicly declared that it was ending its reliance on private prisons and putting “the Department of Justice on a path to ensure that all federal inmates
are ultimately housed at bureau facilities.” Deputy Attorney General Sally
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Q. Yates, Reducing our Use of Private Prisons (August 18, 2016), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/phasing-out-our-use-private-prisons.
VI. WHAT NEXT AT OFPP?
As we go to press, we had heard nothing with regard to the future of the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), nor do we expect that to garner
significant attention early in the new administration. The only early clue is
that the Trump transition team announced that Mick Mulvaney, a Republican
Representative from South Carolina, would be nominated to serve as Director
of OMB (the Office of Management and Budget). Mulvaney’s initial statement
suggested that: “The Trump administration will restore budgetary and fiscal
sanity back in Washington after eight years of an out-of-control, tax and spend
financial agenda, and will work with Congress to create policies that will be
friendly to American workers and businesses[.]” Otherwise, Mulvaney “does not
have a long record on IT issues, but his time in Congress suggests an interest
in cutting spending, outsourcing to the private sector and shrinking the federal
workforce by attrition.” Chase Gunter, Mulvaney’s Record Shows Tilt Toward
Outsourcing, Cutting Federal Workforce, Federal Computer Week (December
19, 2016), https://fcw.com/articles/2016/12/19/mulvaney-omb-gunter.aspx.
We are optimistic that the new administration will seek to identify an
experienced and forceful leader who, among other things, will support investment in the government acquisition workforce. (Such a leader, for example,
must persuasively oppose freezing the acquisition workforce at its current
level.) We hope to see a reinvigorated Office of Federal Procurement Policy
responsible for more than managing the promulgation and implementation
of collateral and compliance based rules, mandates, and record generation
initiatives. Frankly, we think that the government’s approach to category
management needs to be refocused on providing real benefits to buying
agencies. (We also wonder whether GSA, rather than OFPP, might not be a
more appropriate champion for the category management movement.) OFPP
Proposes OMB Circular For Category Management, 58 GC ¶ 365; 81 Fed. Reg.
69860 (Oct. 7, 2016); OFPP Appoints ‘Category Managers’ To Lead Procurement Streamlining Initiative, 58 GC ¶ 75.
Ultimately, we would love to see OFPP leading a government-wide conversation on, among other things:
•

achieving outcomes rather than focusing on processes,

•

how the government can obtain value for its money,

•

generating customer satisfaction for end users and agency leadership,

•

building productive and efficient relationships and lines of communications between government customers and private sector
institutions;

•

reducing transaction costs and increasing purchasing speed,

•

ensuring the highest standards of quality control,

•

maintaining and sustaining critical aspects of the industrial base,
and

•

bringing common sense to the federal marketplace.

Hope springs eternal.
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